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Uncertainty in claiming damages for defects in property 
In Project Management Company No 2 Pty Ltd v Cushway Blackford & Associates 
Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 102 the appellant sought leave to join its parent company party 
(Project Management Company No 1) as a plaintiff to the proceedings and to amend 
its statement of claim.  It was argued that the parent company had suffered the loss 
claimed in the proceedings, rather than the appellant.   
Rule 69(1)(b)(ii) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) allows a 
court at any stage of the proceeding to order that ‘a person whose 
presence before the court would be desirable, just and convenient to 
enable the court to adjudicate effectually and completely on all matters in 
dispute connected with the proceeding’ be include as a party.  To 
determine this issue, the Court of Appeal had to review the law relevant to 
            
           
           
       
     
              
                
              
              
      
                
             
                 
                
            
            
   
              
                
UNCERTAINTY IN CLAIMING DAMAGES FOR DEFECTS IN PROPERTY  
In Project Management Company No 2 Pty Ltd v Cushway Blackford & Associates Pty Ltd [2011] 
QCA 102 the appellant sought leave to join its parent company party (Project Management Company 
No 1) as a plaintiff to the proceedings and to amend its statement of claim.  It was argued that the 
parent company had suffered the loss claimed in the proceedings, rather than the appellant.   
Rule 69(1)(b)(ii) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) allows a court at any stage of the 
proceeding to order that ‘a person whose presence before the court would be desirable, just and 
convenient to enable the court to adjudicate effectually and completely on all matters in dispute 
connected with the proceeding’ be include as a party.  To determine this issue, the Court of Appeal 
had to review the law relevant to the proceedings – a claim in negligence for pure economic loss, in 
particular, the principles espoused by the High Court in Bryan v Maloney(1995) 182 CLR 609 and 
Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515. 
 
CLAIMING IN NEGLIGENCE 
 
In Bryan v Maloney the High Court held that a duty of care was owed by the builder of a residential 
dwelling to the subsequent purchaser for the negligent construction which caused economic loss to the 
subsequent purchaser.  The High Court had reasoned that a duty existed based upon the principle of 
proximity, assumption of responsibility of the builder, reliance of the purchaser and that such a duty 
equated with the duty the builder owed to the first owner. 
 
In Woolcock Street Investments, the High Court held that the principles of Bryan v Maloney did not 
extend to subsequent purchasers of commercial premises.  Doubt as to the value of Bryan v Maloney 
as a precedent was expressed, as Bryan had been decided when proximity was the ‘conceptual 
determinant and unifying theme’ (2004) 216 CLR 515, 528) of novel duties of care and ‘[d]ecisions of 
the Court after Bryan v Maloney reveal that proximity is no longer seen as the ‘conceptual 
determinant’ of this area’ (at 528). 
 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT COMPANY NO 2 PTY LTD V CUSHWAY BLACKFORD & 
ASSOCIATES PTY LTD  
In 1999, the appellant contracted with BLL to build an abattoir and associated facilities in 
Toowoomba.  BLL engaged the respondent and Harwal (third respondent) as subcontractors.  The 
respondent supplied the electrical design, inspection and certification services and Harwal designed 
and constructed the abattoir’s switchboards.  In 2003 the parent company purchased all of the shares 
in the appellant and in 2004 the appellant granted its parent company a licence to operate the abattoir, 
but maintained ownership of the plant and equipment.  In 2005 a fire in the main switchboard caused 
the abattoir facility to be shut down for five weeks.  The appellant alleged that the respondents were 
negligent.  However, in 2010 it became clear that the parent company that had suffered some of the 
losses claimed in the negligence proceedings, not the appellant. 
The primary judge, hearing the application to join the parent company as a plaintiff, held that 
Fangrove Pty Ltd v Tod Group Holdings Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 404 had rejected extending the 
principles of Bryan v Maloney and that this decision had been followed by the Queensland Court of 
Appeal in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 88, which had in turn 
been dismissed by the High Court.  His Honour reasoned that therefore the principles in Bryan v 
Maloney did not extend to commercial premises, and dismissed the application on the grounds that the 
proposed pleading did not disclose a cause of action. 
Therefore, to determine whether the parent company ought to be joined as a plaintiff, the Court of 
Appeal had to review the law to determine whether the appellant had a cause of action. 
 
CAN A PLAINTIFF CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR LOSS ARISING FROM THE 
PURCHASE OF COMMERCIAL PREMISES? 
The court noted that the facts of the case before it were significantly different from Bryan v Maloney 
and Woolcock Street Investments as ‘the land and improvements continued throughout in the 
ownership of [the appellant], the original contracting party’ (at [16]).  Further, in Project Company 
Management No 2 Pty Ltd, it was not a structural defect or design defect in a building, it was a failure 
in the switchboard which caused a fire.  Due to the fire the abattoir could not operate for five weeks 
and trading losses were incurred. 
The respondent alleged that there was no arguable cause of action as it had been established in 
Woolcock Investments Pty Ltd that a subsequent purchaser of commercial premises could not recover 
damages for the loss caused by the faulty construction of the building, unless it was vulnerable.  In 
Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd it was stated (at 530): 
 ‘Vulnerability’, in this context, is not to be understood as meaning only that the plaintiff was 
likely to suffer damage if reasonable care was not taken.  Rather, ‘vulnerability’ is to be 
understood as a reference to the plaintiff’s inability to protect itself from the consequences of 
a defendant’s want of reasonable care, either entirely or at least in a way which would cast the 
consequences of loss on the defendant. 
Arguing against vulnerability, the respondent alleged that the parent company could have obtained a 
warranty or an assignment if rights from the appellant.  Further, the appellant’s own expert report 
demonstrated that an examination of the electrical drawings and switchboard before the parent 
company started to use the abattoir facilities would have revealed the alleged defects.  Therefore the 
parent company was not vulnerable.  However, the Court of Appeal questioned how vulnerability in 
this case could operate (at [19]): 
 what is reasonable for parties at arms length in a transaction of sale and purchase may not be 
reasonable or even appropriate for dealings between companies in the same group engaged in 
quite a different transaction. 
Indeterminacy was another issue to be considered by the court.  The respondent argued that the parent 
company was ‘merely a member of an indeterminate class which was likely to suffer indeterminate 
loss for an indeterminate period’ (at [22]).  At [23] the court stated ‘that whether the relationship 
between [the parent company] and the respondents is of such a kind as to prevent [the parent 
company] recovering damages on the basis of indeterminacy is very much a question of fact.’  It was 
reasonably foreseeable that the operator of the abattoir facilities would suffer economic loss, giving a 
‘reasonably confined description to the class of the affected persons’ and the extent of the loss would 
be limited ‘by the nature of the product, and the capacity of the plant, as well as the likely duration of 
interruption to the plant’s operation as a result of the failure of one of the plant’s component parts’ (at 
[23]). 
The court concluded (at [27]) that the ‘area of law involved in [the parent company’s] and the 
[appellant’s] claim is evolving.’  Therefore it was more appropriate to determine the joinder of the 
additional plaintiff by reference to general principles, not analysis of the pleaded allegations.  The 
court quoted Kirby J in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd where his Honour observed (at 566): 
Where the law is uncertain, and especially where it is in a state of development, it 
is inappropriate to put a plaintiff out of court if there is a real issue to be tried. The 
proper approach in such cases is one of restraint. Only in a clear case will answers 
be given, and orders made, that have the effect of denying a party its ordinary 
civil right to a trial. This is especially so where, as in many actions for negligence, 
the factual details may help to throw light on the existence of a legal cause of 
action – specifically a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Bryan v Maloney recognised that a subsequent purchaser of a residential dwelling could be owed a 
duty of care for the negligent work of the builder, but since has been criticised and doubted.  
Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd rejected the notion that a commercial party in a business 
transaction was vulnerable in the sense that it could not protect itself from loss.  Project Management 
Company No 2 Pty Ltd v Cushway Blackford & Associates Pty Ltd demonstrates that the law of 
claiming for economic loss, as a subsequent purchaser, for defects of property, is a very uncertain area 
of law.  However, until the High Court is given the opportunity to clarify the principles and the limits 
of claims for economic loss by subsequent purchasers of property, Bryan v Maloney and Woolcock 
Street Investments Pty Ltd, decided in different decades and by different approaches to novel duties of 
care, remain the authorities to be followed.  Project Management Company No 2 Pty Ltd v Cushway 
Blackford & Associates Pty Ltd demonstrates how these cases can be used in different factual 
situations, requiring constant searching for the principles that are not clear. 
Amanda Stickley 
